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Effects on growth of environmental policy in a small open economy 
This paper examines the effect of environmental policy on economic growth 
in a small open economy  in a neoclassical  framework with pollution as an 
input. We show that environmental policy imposes a drag on long run growth 
in  both  the  open  and  closed  economy  cases.  The  effect  of  environmental 
policy on growth is stronger in the open economy case relative to the closed 
economy model if the country has strong aversion to pollution and thus serves 
as a net exporter of capital in the international capital market. On the other 
hand, if the agents in the economy have low aversion to pollution and thus 
import capital, the effect of environmental care on growth is stronger in the 
closed  economy  relative  to  the  open  economy.  Thus,  from  our  set-up, 
environmental policy  is  harmful to  growth but environmental sustainability 
need not be incompatible with continued economic growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
The pollution  haven  hypothesis  (PHH)  is one of the  most contentious and 
hotly debated predictions in all of international environmental economics. The 
central prediction of the PHH is that liberalized trade in goods will lead to the 
relocation of pollution intensive production from high income and stringent 
environmental  regulation  countries  to  low  income  and  lax  environmental 
regulation countries. 
 
The existing literature on the pollution haven hypothesis can be divided into 
two: theoretical and empirical studies on inter-country trade flows (Copeland 
and  Taylor,  1994,  2003;  Levinson  and  Taylor,  2008)  and  studies  (mainly 
empirical)  on  plant  and  industrial  location  (foreign  direct  investment) 
decisions (Kalamova and Johnstone, 2011; Javorcik and Wei, 2004; List and 
Co, 2000). In the studies that focus on regulatory stringency and trade flows, 
the  conclusions  seem  to  back  the  existence  of  pollution  haven  effect.  For 
instance  Levinson  and  Taylor  (2008),  Copeland  and  Taylor  (2004), 
Brunnermeier  and  Levinson  (2004)  and  Ederington  and  Minier  (2003)  all 
found that environmental policy has a significant impact on trade flows that is 
consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis, after using slightly different 
methodologies. 
 
In  this paper,  we  will theoretically analyze  how environmental preferences 
influence the decision to invest abroad and at home, respectively. Thus, more 
relevant to the present paper is a strand within the PHH literature that focuses 
on  the  role  of  capital  mobility,  in  the  form  of  foreign  direct  investment. 
Millimet and  List  (2004)  find  that  the  impacts of environmental policy on 
                                                                 
 I thank Clas Eriksson (Associate Professor of Economics, Mälardalen University College) 
for very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. I also benefited from 
the comments from the participants of the 17
th Ulvon Conference (June 2010) Umeå, Sweden; 
4
th Atlantic Workshop on Environmental and Energy Economics, Vigo, Spain (July 2010) as 
well  as  seminar  participants  at  the  Department  of  Economics,  SLU,  Uppsala  and 
Macroeconomics Group at the Department of Economics, Uppsala University. 
  Environmental  and  Resource  Economics  Unit,  Department  of  Economics,  Swedish 




industry  location  depend  crucially  on  heterogeneity  of  location-specific 
attributes. List and Co (2000) suggest that stringer environmental regulation 
does  influence  negatively  the  location decisions of  inward FDI  in the US. 
Keller  and  Levinson  (2002),  however,  find  a  less  robust  evidence  of  the 
pollution haven effect at the industry level. Xing and Kolstad (2002) find that 
US  outbound  flows  move  significantly  to  host  countries  with  more  lax 
environmental regulations in the heavily polluting industries; this result is not 
valid  for  less  polluting  industries.  The  industry-level  evidence  shows  that 
environmental regulation can influence negatively the location decision of a 
specific  industry, while having  no effect on another polluting  industry (e.g. 
Keller and Levinson (2007), Henderson and Millimet (2007), Waldkirch and 
Gopinath (2008)). 
 
There are only a few papers using FDI data to study pollution havens at the 
global  level. Javorcik and Wei (2004) study the determinants of actual and 
planned investment by 534 major multinational firms in Central and Eastern 
Europe and in the former Soviet Union. They find no robust support for the 
pollution-haven hypothesis. The theoretical model of Eskeland and Harrison 
(2003) shows that, depending on possible complementarities between capital 
and pollution abatement, environmental regulation can lead to an increase or a 
decline in investment in both the host (developing) country and the originating 
(developed) country. In their empirical analysis they find some evidence that 
foreign investors are concentrated in sectors with high levels of air pollution in 
Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco and Ivory Coast, although the evidence is weak. 
In their recent study, Kalamova and Johnstone (2011) established two major 
results regarding the effect of stringent environmental policy and FDI flows. 
First, they show that a relatively lax policy in the host country has a positive 
(although  small)  effect  on  incoming  FDI  flows  in  both  developed  and 
developing countries. However, this effect tends to exhibit an inverse U-shape, 
and  thus reverses below a certain  level of  environmental stringency  in  the 
sample of non-OECD host countries. Thus, once the environmental regime of 




To  back  the  empirical  literature  linking  environmental  regulation  to  FDI 
flows, we undertake a cursory examination of the pattern of FDI flows in 2010 
against  some  measure  of  environmental  regulatory  standards  for  a  cross 
section of 163 countries.  
 
Figure 1.  Ratio of Outward FDI Flows to GDP versus EPI Score 
























































Figure 2. Ratio of Inward FDI Flows to GDP versus EPI Score 






















































Our  main  measure of environmental policy stringency  is the environmental 
performance  index  (EPI)
1 score. Our preliminary examinations of the data 
reveal the relationship presented in Figures 1 and 2 in which we plot the ratio 
of outward and inward FDI flows to GDP respectively against the EPI score. 
The revelation is that the EPI score is inversely related to inward FDI flows 
expressed as a ratio to GDP while the relationship is positive for outward 
flows also expressed as a ratio to GDP. The observed relationship in the data 
have the implication that inward (outward)  FDI flows are higher in countries 
with lower (higher) EPI score and thus lends support to the pollution haven 
hypothesis. We do not push this far as this is only a pair of bivariate plots and 
the observed relationship  may change as we allow  for  more contro ls, but 
together with the reviewed literature above it gives a reason enough for a 
theoretical  investigation  of  the  relation  between  preferred  environmental 
policy and international capital flows. 
 
This  paper  complements  the  existing  theoretical  literature   on  the  PHH  
phenomenon.  In  particular,  we  extend  the  basic  static  multi-sector  trade 
models in the previous literature (e.g. Copeland and Taylor 1994; 2003) into a 
dynamic model. To do this in a simplified framework, we use a one -sector 
aggregated  growth  model with pollution,  similar to Brock (1977)
2, which 
allows  for  international capital  flows.   In the previous  literature, a  higher 
demand for environmental quality forces (some of) the dirty production sector 
abroad. In this paper, a high demand for environmental quality directs savings 
away from polluting domestic production investments to investments on the 
“clean” (from the small country‟s perspective) international capital markets. 
The model contains only one physical kind of good, but foreigners can buy 
domestic output and domestic residents can buy foreign output. The function 
                                                                 
1 The 2010 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranks 163 countries on 25 performance 
indicators tracked across ten policy categories covering both environmental public health and 
ecosystem vitality. These indicators provide a gauge at a national government  scale of how 
close  countries  are  to  establish  governmental  policy  goals.  The  EPI‟s  proximity-to-target 
methodology  facilitates  cross-country  comparisons  as  well  as  analysis  of  how  the  global 
community  is  doing  collectively  on  each  particular  policy  issue.  Source:  Yale Center for 
Environmental Law & Policy (http://epi.yale.edu/Countries)  
2 See also Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Forster, 1973; Gruver, 1976; Brock, 1977; 
Becker, 1982; Musu, 1989; Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, 1993; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 
1991; Selden and Song, 1995, for similar studies. However, none of these studies allows for 
international capital flows. 5 
 
of international (and inter-temporal) trade in our model is to allow domestic 
production  to  diverge  from  domestic  expenditure  on  consumption  and 
investment. Thus we consider the intertemporal aspects of international trade 
but  neglect the  implications  for patterns of  inter-sectoral specialization and 
comparative advantage in production. The latter case is well addressed in the 
previous literature (see for instance Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Levinson and 
Taylor, 2008). 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of optimal environmental 
pollution on economic growth in a small open economy in which pollution 
serves as an input. The idea of modelling pollution as serving as an input in 
the production function is not novel; see for instance Brock (1977) and Becker 
(1980). Copeland and Taylor (1994; 2003) suggest a formal motivation for this 
approach. The novelty of this paper is its extension of the basic model to a 
small open economy in which capital can flow across national borders and the 
complementary explanation of the pollution haven hypothesis that  it offers. 
The central question that this paper answers  is: what determines whether a 
country imports capital (and thereby hosts considerable volumes of polluting 
production)  or  exports  capital  (leaving  considerable  part  of  polluting 
production to the rest of the world)? In addition to this, we examine how the 
preference for a clean environment (environmental policy) influences national 
income and its growth rate.  
 
To  ensure  that  the  economy‟s  intertemporal  budget  constraint  binds,  we 
assume that the parameters are such that both the capital stock and aggregate 
consumption grow at rates lower than the world interest rate. This will ensure 
that  there  is  no Ponzi  game  with respect  to  foreign debt.  In order  for our 
hypothetical economy to stay “small” as time runs, we assume that the growth 
rates of consumption and the capital stock are lower than the growth rate of 
the rest of the world. This assumption requires that our hypothetical economy 
has high preference for environmental quality relative to the rest of the world. 
 
Our  analysis  reveals  the  following  conclusions.  Within  our  framework  we 
show that  it  is not changes  in comparative advantage due to differences  in 6 
 
environmental policy per se that generates the pollution havens, but the fact 
that the environmental quality is a normal good. Environmental care imposes a 
drag on long run economic growth, by increasing the capital-output ratio and 
lowering the returns to capital. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the drag 
that the demand for environmental quality imposes on growth is larger in the 
open economy if and only if consumption grows faster than the capital stock. 
In the reverse case where the capital stock grows faster than consumption, the 
drag is smaller in the open economy case relative to the closed economy. 
 
Our analysis of the open economy case also reveals that whilst the  growth 
rates of consumption, output, the capital stock and pollution are constant, there 
are three possible qualitative scenarios with respect to the debt depending on 
the relation between the growth rates of consumption and the capital stock. 
First, we considered a benchmark scenario in which consumption and capital 
grow at a common rate. Under this scenario, we show that the debt and capital 
stock grow at a common rate and hence the debt-capital ratio is constant at all 
points in time. The implication of this is that the history of the debt and the 
capital stock puts a constraint on the initial consumption level. We show that a 
country  which  has  had  a  history  of  generous  lending  will  benefit  from  it 
twofold. It can afford  to choose a  high consumption path  and also  have a 
considerable share of its income from the international capital market, which 
does not cause any negative pollution effect on this country. In the second case 
where consumption grows faster than the capital stock, we show that the small 
open economy eventually exports  capital  (negative  debt)  to the rest of  the 
world by accumulating assets abroad over time. This process is faster if the 
elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution is high relative to the rest of the 
world so that it has higher drag on (production) growth. As a final scenario, 
we considered the opposite scenario where the capital stock grows faster than 
consumption. In this case we show that the economy imports capital due to the 
low aversion to pollution, and thus accumulate debt. To summarize, we show 
that a high demand for environmental quality in our small open economy is 
found  to  induce  capital  flight  to  countries  with  lower  demand  for 
environmental  quality.  This  result  offers  an  alternative  restatement  of  the 
pollution haven hypothesis.  7 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic 
open economy growth model in which pollution augments the primary inputs 
(man-made capital and labour) in the production process. The model solution 
and its implication for long run growth are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
modifies our basic  model of Section 2 and Section 3 to a closed economy 
model with optimal policy and also compares the results in the open economy 
with the closed economy outcome. Section 5 concludes the paper. All  the 
analyses  in  the  paper  are  based  on  command  optimal  solution.  The 
decentralized  solution  is  presented  in  the  appendix  and  the  equivalence 
between  command  optimum  and  the  decentralized  solution  is  established 
therein. 
 
2.     The Basic Model 
Even though we will provide the solution to a central-planner problem, the 
model is here presented in a typical decentralized economy style. The purpose 
is that it will be useful for the brief description of the decentralized solution in 
the appendix. Besides, the decentralized expressions are easily transformed to 
the  “planner  expressions”,  while  it  is  more  difficult  to  go  the  other  way 
around. 
 
Our  setup  begins  with  an  open  economy  neoclassical-type  model  with 
environmental concern. The role of government is limited to taxing polluting 
firms, and redistributing the proceeds to households as a way of internalizing 
(and compensating  for) externalities  generated through production. We thus 
abstract from government purchases; only households and firms interact at the 
market place. The behaviour of firms and households in this model economy 
are described below.   
 
2.1 Firms 
The  firms  produce  goods  with  effective  labour () LT ,  capital  () K and 
pollution() Z ,  according  to  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  which 8 
 
exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale  in  its  three  arguments.  The  production 
function takes the form of equation (1).
3 
 
1 ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) Y t K t Z t L t T t K t Z t L t T t
      .               (1) 
Here Y(t) is the flow of output at time t, and all other variables are as defined 
already.  The  index  of  technological  progress,  T,  is  assumed  to  grow 
exogenously at the rate x. Raw labour, L, grows at the exogenous rate, n.  
 
Firms are atomistic and pay each input its marginal contribution to output. The 
problem  facing a representative  firm then  is to  maximize profits  given by 
equation  (2).  We  set  up  the  maximization  problem  in  terms  of  aggregate 
variables,  which,  given  the  representative  firm,  is  without  any  loss  of 
generality. Output price has been normalized at unity and the representative 
firm  faces both competitive  factor  markets and product  market.  The profit 
function is: 
1 () K Z LT RK wL Z
    
     ,                                                             (2) 
where  R is the rental price of capital services,  w is the real wage and   is the 
tax per unit of pollution.  
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                         (5) 
                                                                 
3 The idea behind this formulation is that “techniques of production are less costly in terms of capital inputs if more 
pollution is allowed”. To give the rational for augmenting the aggregate production function as an input in a more 
formal way, suppose that gross output is produce with capital and effective labour and takes the following general 
form  ( , ) Y F K LT  .    Suppose  further that  pollution  is  proportional to  gross  output  according  to the  relation 
() Z f Y .A constant fraction of the gross output   is used as input for abatement. This leaves a net out Put of 
(1 ) YY   which is available for consumption, investment and export. Assume that   1/ ( ) 1 f     , where  01  . 
This  implies that    1/ (1 ) ( , ) 1 ( , ) Z F K LT Z F K LT        .    This  and  the  expression  for  net  output  gives 
 1 ( , ) Y Z F K LT     , which is constant returns in Z, K and L  and can conveniently be written in the form of (1) as 
above without loss of generality.
 For a motivation of having Z as an input, see Chapter two of Copeland and Taylor 
(2003).   
  9 
 
Equation (3) is the derivative of the profit function with respect to capital. This 
condition states that the firm‟s optimal choice of capital equates the value of 
the marginal product of capital to the rental rate of capital. Equation (4) is the 
optimality condition with respect to pollution: the firm sets the value of the 
marginal product of pollution equal to the tax rate. Since the marginal product 
of pollution is decreasing in the levels of emissions, a low tax rate will induce 
high pollution. Note that the pollution tax payment, / ZY   , is a constant 
share of the produced value, irrespective of the tax rate,   .  The optimality 
condition with respect to labour input is given in (5): the firm sets the value of 
the marginal product of labour equal to the wage rate. 
 
We  now  follow  some  implications  that  will  occur  frequently  in  this  paper. 
First, defining the capital-output ratio,  / v K Y  and using  rR  , where r 
is the market interest rate










                      (6) 
Note  that  the  capital-output  ratio  is  an  inverse  measure  of  the  average 
productivity of capital. From equation (6), it is clear that the net rate of return 
on capital is inversely related to the capital-output ratio. This is as expected: 
an increase in the net rate of return to capital means high cost of capital and 
hence lowers demand for capital since capital exhibits diminishing marginal 
returns.  
 
From equation (1) we derive another implication that will be used frequently 





          .                   (7)
 
Furthermore by the optimality condition  in equation (4), the growth rate of 
pollution satisfies the expression in (8).       
                                                                 
4 Here, r(t) is the net rate of return; R(t) is the gross return on capital and   is the rate of 
depreciation of capital. The reason why this relationship holds among these variables is that in 
the absence of uncertainty, capital and loans are perfect substitutes as stores of value and, as a 







                        (8) 
According  to  equation  (8),  the  growth  rate  of  pollution  is  the  difference 
between  the  growth  rates  of  two  variables:  aggregate  output  and  the 
environmental tax rate. Pollution is constant if the growth rates of these two 
variables are equal. However, if output grows faster than the environmental 
tax rate, pollution will  increase over  time: because the  higher  Y raises  the 
marginal product of pollution. On the contrary, an ambitious environmental 
policy  that  allows  the  tax  rate  to  grow  faster  than  production  will  make 
pollution decline over time. 
 
Another  useful  implication  from  the  firm  side  is  obtained  by  substituting 









   


        
                 (9) 
One can quickly see  the effect of  the  growth  in the  environmental  tax on 
economic growth from equation (9). The growth rate of the tax term enters the 
expression  for  the  growth  rate  of  aggregate  production  negatively.  This 
suggests that the environmental tax exerts a drag on long run growth. We take 
up the detailed analysis of this in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper. 
 
A  final  useful  implication  from  the  firm  side  is  obtained  by  taking  the 




                      (10) 
According to equation (10), the wage and per capita income grow at the same 
rate, which is equal to the growth rate of GDP less the population growth rate. 
Equations (6), (8), (9) and (10) together with the optimality conditions (3)-(5) 
will play key role  in the derivations  in the rest of  the paper and  we shall 





We begin by considering an  infinite-horizon economy and suppose that the 
economy admits a normative representative household with the instantaneous 
utility function 
11 ( / ) 1
( / , ) ,
11
C L Z







  0   ,  0   , 0   .             (11) 
The  utility  function  is additively separable  in the  level of consumption per 
person C/L and  the  level of pollution. The parameter is the weight of  the 
disutility of pollution,    is the elasticity of  marginal  utility of consumption
5 
and   is  the elasticity of  marginal disutility of pollution. The instantaneous 
utility  function  is  twice continuously differentiable  in both of  its arguments 
and strictly concave in C/L and strictly convex in Z.  
 
Households are atomistic and take prices in both the output and factor markets 
as  given.  Each  individual  owns  one  unit  of  labour  which  he  supplies 
inelastically at any wage rate.  The  household  receives a  lump-sum  transfer 
() t    from  the  government  as  a  compensation  for  the  deterioration  in 
environmental quality, due to activities of firms in period t. There are negative 
externalities in the form of environmental pollution but the single household 
cannot  influence that. Households  use  income that they do  not consume to 
accumulate more assets according to the following dynamic equation 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) A t r t A t w t L t t C t      .                 (12) 
Here  ( ) ( )/ A t dA t dt  is the change in households‟ asset at time t, A(t) is the 
total households assets at time t, C(t) is the aggregate household consumption 
at time t. All other variables are as defined already. To develop equation (12), 
we first assume that the government balances the budget in each period so that 
the budget constraint is given by 
Z   ,                     (13) 
 where  Z  is the total revenue from environmental taxation.   
We now take the economy‟s international affairs into account, by introducing, 
D  for  the  international debt.  The  international debt corresponds to  foreign 
                                                                 
5  In this paper we assume  1   as these values of   has empirical support (see:  Hall, 1988; 
Hahm, 1998; Gali, 2008; Jones, 2009). 
 12 
 
claims  on  the  domestic  economy.  However,  if  households  assets  holdings 
exceeds the capital stock (a negative D), domestic residents have claims on the 
rest of the world and hence accumulate assets abroad. This  means that the 
assets of this open economy are A=K-D, and thus  A K D . Equation (12) 
can therefore be rewritten as equation (14). 
K D rK wL Z rD C                         (14) 
Using  now  Rr ,  the  optimality  conditions  in  (3) -(5)  and  the 
government‟s budget constrain in  (13), equation (14) simplifies to 
K K Y D rD C       .                  (15) 
Equation (15) is the constraint on aggregate resources in the open economy. 
The aggregate resource constraint in (15) can be disaggregated into two sub 
constraints:  debt  and  capital  accumulation  constraints.  The  change  in  the 
foreign debt at any point in time is the difference between domestic absorption 
and domestic production (GDP). That is; 
D C I rD Y     .                   (16) 
The debt grows if domestic absorption is higher than production in that period. 
The  first  constraint  in  (19)  is  the  equation  of  motion  for  foreign  debt. 
According to this constraint, the change in foreign debt at any point in time is 
the  sum  of  consumption,  investment  and  interest  payments  on  debt  less 
production in that period (change in the current account deficit). The world 
interest rate, r is taken as given by our small open economy.  
 
The constraint on capital accumulation satisfies: 
K I K   .                    (17) 
According to equation (17), gross investment covers replacement investment 
and capital expansion. The capital stock grows over time if gross investment 
more than offset gross depreciation. 
 
A brief refresher in national income accounting identities and definitions may 
be useful at this point. The gross domestic product (GDP) is the total money 
value of all final goods and services produced in an economy over a period of 
time,  usually one  year.  Mathematically, GDP= C+I+NX,  where NX  is  net 
exports (exports-imports). GNP is the total money value of all final goods and 13 
 
services produced with  inputs owned by the citizens of a  given economy, 
irrespective of the physical  location of the  inputs. We obtain the GNP by 
adding the current account balance (negative of the change in the foreign debt 
over time) to the GDP. In our case, the mathematical expression for GNP is; 
GNP=GDP-rD. We show  later  how the  international capital  market can be 
used to compensate for a decline in GDP due to environmental policy for a 
country that is a net lender in the international capital market.  
 
 
3.       The social planner’s problem 
In  the  growth  literature,  it  has been established that  the command optimal 
allocation  and  the  decentralized  equilibrium  allocation  are  equivalent,  if 
externalities are properly  internalized.  By assuming  an optimal policy that 
fully  internalized  the  pollution  externality  right  away,  we  exploit  this 
equivalence here and thus will only solve the command optimal allocations in 
both the open and closed versions of the model (See appendix A and B for the 
solution to the decentralized allocation). 
 
 
3.1 The problem and first-order conditions 
The problem facing a benevolent social planner is to maximize the discounted 
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11







     ,                 (18) 
subject to  0 (0) DD  ,  0 (0) KK   and; 
D C I rD Y      and  K I K                     (19) 
Here;    is the subjective rate of time preference.  
 
The current  value  Hamiltonian  for the command optimal  allocation problem 
is: 
11 ( / )
( / , , , , , ) ( ) ( )
11
C L Z
H C L Z K D q C I rD Y q I K

   






The shadow prices (costate variables) on the equation of motion of the foreign 
debt and the capital accumulation equation in (19) are   and  q respectively. 
The shadow price of debt accumulation  is expected to be  negative as adding 
more  debt  reduces  future  utility.  The  planner‟s  choice  of  consumption, 
investment and pollution that maximize the discounted sum of utility for the 
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                          (25) 
() lim ( ) ( ) 0
nt
t t D t e
 

                    (26) 
() lim ( ) ( ) 0
nt
t q t K t e
 
                    (27) 
Equations (21)-(23) are the optimality conditions with respect to consumption, 
investment and pollution. The rates of change of the shadow prices satisfy 
equations (24) and (25). It is not hard to see that the shadow prices grow at the 
same  rate.  This  is  necessary  for condition (22) to  hold  in all periods:  the 
absolute values of the shadow prices are equal in all periods only if they have 
an equal growth rate. By (22), not only are the growth rates of the co-state 
variables equal, but also their initial (absolute) values; hence  (0) (0) q  . 
Equations  (26)  and  (27)  are  the  transversality  conditions  for  the  debt  and 
capital stock respectively. 
 
By (22) we have  // qq   . This, (24) and (25) imply the following steady 







                      (28) 
Recall that by the small open economy assumption, r is constant. Hence, the 
capital-output ratio goes to  its steady state value  instantly, due to the rapid 15 
 
capital  flows  that equate the  international and domestic  interest  rates.  The 
steady state capital-output ratio decreases in the exogenous world interest rate 
and  the  rate  of  depreciation,  but  increases  in  the  elasticity  of  output  with 
respect to the capital stock. These results are quite plausible. A high world 
interest rate encourages investments abroad just as a high rate of depreciation 
will.  This  holds capital accumulation back and  therefore  the capital-output 
ratio falls. On the other hand, higher elasticity of output with respect to capital 
makes firms demand more capital for a given level of output.  
 
To develop some implications of the above conditions, we start by taking logs 
of equation (21), differentiating it with respect to time, and using the equation 
of motion for the costate variable in (24) and the steady state expression for 
the capital-output ratio  in equation (28).  We then obtain the consumption 







   .                     (29) 
Remarkably,  the  consumption  growth  rate  is  constant  from  time  zero  on, 
because  the  world  interest  rate  is  constant.  The  growth  rate  of  aggregate 
consumption  is positive  if and only  if  rn   . Per capita consumption 
grows  if and only  if  r   ,  as  usual.  We  will  assume  this  latter  inequality 
holds  from  here  onwards.  As  in  the  standard  neoclas sical  model,  the 
consumption growth rate increases with the world interest rate and population 
growth rate but decreases with the subjective rate of time preference and the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.  
 
Another useful implication of the necessary conditions concerns pollution. The 










      
.                  (30) 
This  expression  says  that  the  socially  optimal  growth  rate  of  pollution 
increases with the growth rate of the shadow cost of the debt and the growth 
rate  of  aggregate  production  but  decreases  in  the  elasticity  of  marginal 16 
 
disutility of pollution. This is quite intuitive: as the growth rate of the shadow 
cost of the debt increases, the planner increases domestic production to reduce 
the  imports of consumables. A  high  growth rate of production will require 
more of every input including pollution. On the other hand, a higher elasticity 
of marginal disutility of pollution raises the social cost of pollution and thus 
causes a reduction in the socially optimal emissions growth rate. 
 
Turning to the transversality conditions, we first integrate equations (24) and 
(25) to obtain the following time paths for the shadow cost of the debt and the 
shadow price of capital respectively: 
 
() ( ) (0)
n r t te
 
               and              
() ( ) (0)
n r t q t q e
  .                       (31) 
Combining equation (31) with the transversality conditions in (26) and (27), 
we obtain the following conditions that hold along an optimal path.  
lim (0) ( ) 0
rt
t e D t 

           and            lim (0) ( ) 0
rt
t q e K t

               (32) 
The  expressions  in  (32)  imply  the  following  asymptotic  conditions  on  the 
growth rates of the debt and the capital stock:  / D D r   and  / K K r  . That 
is the socially optimal steady state  growth rates of the debt and the capital 
stock should be lower than the world interest rate asymptotically. This implies 
that they do not grow in present value terms, asymptotically.  
 
3.2 Solving the model 
We  now  derive  the  socially  optimal  long-run  growth  rates  of  aggregate 
domestic production, the capital stock, pollution, consumption and the debt.  
We find that the growth rates of K, Y, C and Z are constant from time zero and 
remain so. For D and  / CK   , however, growth may be non-constant (if for 
instance  income  and  consumption  grow  at  different  rates),  but  we  must 
examine whether such paths are consistent with the transversality conditions 
and the small country assumption. We present the cases of constant growth 
rates  in Section 3.2.1 while the differential equations  for  the consumption-
capital ratio ( / CK   ) and the debt (D) are presented in Section 3.2.2. 
3.2.1 The growth rates of the capital stock and pollution 
We begin by combining equation (30) with the expression for the growth rate 
of  aggregate  production  in  (7).  This  and  the  steady  state  condition  that 17 
 
// Y Y K K  , combined with equation (24), give the following expression for 
the steady state growth rate of the capital stock and domestic production. 
( ) ( )
(1 )(1 )
YK
K n x n r





   
    
  
               (33) 
Before we analyse the effect of environmental care on economic growth, it is 
important to impose a condition on the interest rate using the transversality 
condition.  Equation  (33)  and  the  transversality  condition  impose  this 
restriction on the world interest rate: 











Substitution of (33)  into  (30) and some algebraic  simplifications  yield  the 
following expression  for the socially optimal steady state rate of change of 
emissions in the open economy model. 
(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )
Z r n x x
Z
   
  
     

  
               (34) 
Note that pollution is a direct policy variable here, since we are analyzing the 
central-planner  problem  and  therefore  do  not  include  any  taxes.  Hence 
equation (34) defines the steady state optimal policy rule. As can be seen from 
(33)  and  (34),  the  growth  rates  of  Y,  K  and  Z  are  all  independent  of  the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption,  . 
 
The sign of the growth rate of pollution over time depends on the sign of the 
numerator term since the denominator is known to be positive. The sign of the 
numerator  term  in  (34)  is  ambiguous.  If  (1 )( ) ( ) (1 ) r n x x           , 
then the overall  term  in  the  numerator  is  unambiguously  negative and  the 
socially optimal growth rate of pollution will decrease over time. On the other 
hand,  if  (1 )( ) ( ) (1 ) r n x x           ,  then  sign  of  the  numerator  is 
positive and the socially optimal growth rate of pollution increases over time. 
Thus the steady state growth rate of emissions in the open economy hinges on 
the following condition;       
(1 )( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) / ( )0 r n x x Z Z               . 
The steady state growth rate of pollution is a decreasing function of the world 
interest rate, and the rate of population growth. A higher elasticity of marginal 18 
 
disutility of pollution  lowers  the absolute rate of change  Z,  irrespective of 
whether  it  is  positive  or  negative.  However,  the  growth  rate  of  pollution 
increases in the subjective rate of time preference and the rate of technological 
progress. The higher the elasticity of output with respects to effective labour, 
the stronger the latter effect. 
 
We  now  turn  to  the  examination  of  the  effect  of  environmental  care  on 
economic growth. The numerator in the final term in (33) is unambiguously 
negative since r   . By the constant returns to scale assumption, denominator 
in the final term in (33) can be shown to be positive. This makes the final term 
in (33) negative and thus makes the growth rate obtained here lower than what 
the  standard  model  predicts  (which  would  be n + x). Hence environmental 
protection imposes a drag on steady state growth rates. The magnitude of this 
negative effect depends among other things on the elasticity of output with 
respect to pollution and the elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution.  
 
The effect of the elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution on the common 
growth rate of the capital stock and output  is ambiguous.  To show this we 




(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )
Y g r n x x    
   
      

   
               (35) 
The sign of the above derivative depends on the sign of the numerator term as 
the denominator is known to be positive. The first two terms in the numerator 
is positive whilst the final term is negative. However, the sign of the overall 
term in the numerator is ambiguous. However a negative sign of the derivative 
in (35) would  not be totally  unreasonable, because the  higher elasticity of 
marginal disutility of pollution will at least lead to a lower level of pollution 
according to (23). The elasticity of output with respect to pollution has much 
role to play here. If this elasticity is high, then the numerator will more likely 
be positive. Thus with higher elasticity of output with respect to pollution, the 
first two terms  in  the  numerator could dominate the  final  term. Thus,  it  is 19 
 
possible for a higher   to increase the growth rate of the economy. A higher 
value of  will increase (lower) the growth rate of the economy if and only if 
(1 ) ( )(1 )( ) ( ) x r n x            . 
Thus, the effect on growth of the elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution is 
positive if and only if the growth rate of pollution is negative, an indication of 
a high demand for environmental quality (see equation (34)). 
 
3.2.2 Dynamics of the time path of consumption and the debt 
We  turn  now  to  the  steady  state  socially  optimal  growth  rate  of  the 
consumption-capital  ratio.  By  the  definition  of  the  consumption-capital 
ratio, / CK   , its growth rate is  /// C C K K  . 
This,  (30)  and  (33)  gives  the  following  steady  state  growth  rate  of  the 
consumption-capital ratio 
1 ( ) ( )
()
(1 )(1 )
n x n r
g r x 
  

    
   
    
  
.               (36) 




   .                   (37) 
Clearly,  g can be positive, negative or zero, depending on the values of the 
parameters.  The  growth  rate of the consumption -capital ratio  is positive 
(negative) if consumption growth rate is greater (less than) than the growth 
rate of the capital stock. If the gr owth rates of consumption and capital are 
equal, then the growth rate of the consumption -capital ratio is zero. Any of 
these cases is possible in an open economy. We discuss this in detail in 
Section 3.3 under two scenarios and their implications for the asset position of 
the economy in the international capital markets. 
 
For this we also need the time path of debt. Starting with the derivation of the 
dynamic equation of the debt -capital ratio we first divide through equation 
(15) by K to obtain 
 
K D Y C D
r
K K K K K
      .                 (38) 
Now define  / d D K  , which implies that  20 
 
/ / / / ( / ) d d D D K K D K d d K K      . This and (38) combines to give 
the following expression.  
  ( (1 ) )/ (0)
gt
KK d g r e g r d
                                              (39) 
The solution to this differential equation is  
() (0)
K gt g r t
K




     









   

,  and  








       
. 
The expression for  may be positive or negative, while B is positive because 
of the transversality condition.  
 
To describe the development of the debt  in absolute  terms,  we recall that 
/ d D K  , where  (0)
K gt K K e  . Thus (40) can be rewritten as  
(0) (0)
( ) (0) (0)
C K gt gt rt
K
K





.                (41) 
Since the growth rate of the final term is r, the transversality condition cannot 
be satisfied unless  (0)   is chosen by the social planner such that  0  .  This 
gives the following expressions for  (0)  and  (0) C  respectively; 
   (0) (0) K r g g B d        and      (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) K C K r g g B d K        , 
The final solution thus is  
  ( ) (0) (0) (0)
C K gt gt D t K Be B d K e    .                (42) 
It  is  assumed  that    (0) 0 Bd  ;  otherwise  the  economy  is  so  heavily 
indebted  from the start that  it  has  to choose  negative consumption.  This  is 
counterfactual.  
 
3.3 Two scenarios 
The dynamics of the open economy model is now given by the four equations, 
(29), (33), (34) and (42). The first three give constant growth rates for C, K, Y 
and Z. There are  however  two possible, and qualitative different, scenarios 
with  respect  to  D,  depending  on  the  relation  between  C g   and  K g .    One 
possibility is of course that K, C and D all grow at the same rate, but it is quite 21 
 
unlikely that the parameters are related in such a way. We will therefore also 
examine another possibility where consumption and capital grow at different 
rates. 
 
In relation to this, there are two important conditions that must be fulfilled: the 
TVC  and that  the  economy  stays „small‟ as  time  runs.  To ensure this  we 
impose the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 1 
i.  C gr   and  K gr   so that the long run value of  / DD  is always lower 
than the international interest rate. 
ii.  For some  0   , the growth rate of the rest of the world is  W g n x     ; 
moreover,  CW gg  and  KW gg   
iii. Our  representative  economy  has  a  strong  aversion  to  pollution.  Also 
 and     are  sufficiently  large  so  that  the  drag  on  growth  of 
environmental policy is large relative to the rest of the world. 
 
3.3.1 The benchmark case:  KC gg   
We  now  assume  that  the  parameters  in  equation  (36)  are  such  that 
K Y C g g g implying that  0 g  at all points in time. That is
6 
1 [1 (1 ) (1 ) ]( ) [(1 ) ] r x n         
                     (43) 
The bracket on the left hand side is clearly positive. It is reasonable to assume 
that(1 ) 0 xn        , because only then can  we have  0 r  which  is 
necessary for growth in per capita consumption. 
 
Some central expressions now take specific values. Solving for  r   in (43) 
and substituting this into (29) we obtain the growth rate of consumption as: 
1
1
(1 )( ) (1 ) (1 )




    
   


     

   
,             (44) 
                                                                 
6 One way to get this, is to assume that  r    and  0 nx , which is what Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989) do. There are however other parameter constellations that will make  0 g   
in (37), and we can allow for these possibilities as well. 22 
 
which of course also is the growth rate of K and Y. The growth rate is clearly 
positive.  Next  substituting  for  r     in  equation  (34)  and  simplifying  the 
resulting expression, we have: 
1
1
(1 )[1 (1 ) ][(1 ) ]
[(1 )(1 ) ][1 (1 ) (1 ) ]
Z x n
Z
      
      


      

      
             (45) 
Because  KC gg  , (42) boils down to  
( ) (0)
K gt D t D e   
This  implies  that  (0) dd  at all points  in time.  This  further pin down  the 
initial consumption to  
 
(1 )( )
(0) (0) (0) (0) ( ) C
r
C K K D r g


       
. 
In  this  case  it  is  very  obvious  how  the  history  of  debt  and  capital  puts 
constraint on the initial consumption level. There is no room for deciding how 
large a debt-capital ratio to have; it is given by history. An economy which has 
had  a  history of  generous  lending ( (0) 0 d  )  will benefit  from  it twofold. 
First, it can afford to choose a high consumption path. Second, it will have a 
considerable share of its income from the international capital market, which 
does not cause any negative pollution effects on this country. Note however, 
that this share of income is not a result of optimal current choice, but it is 
given by history. 
 
The  value  of  the  elasticity  of  marginal  utility  of  consumption  plays  an 
important role in the above discussions. To understand the importance of this 
parameter, we set  1    as a starting point. Then, Z is constant and the growth 












When  Z  is  constant,  the  remaining  production  factors  in  the  production 
function, K, and L experience diminishing returns to scale. This creates drag 
on growth
7. 
                                                                 
7 If  0   , then  C g x n , which is the growth rate in the standard model without 
environmental protection. Thus if pollution is useless (has zero partial elasticity) then 
environmental policy does not create drag on growth.  23 
 
 
In  order  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  preference  parameters  here,  we 
examine the derivatives of (44) and (45), given that equation (43) continues to 
hold. We begin these investigations by first considering the effect of changes 
in    on the growth rate of consumption (equation 44) and the growth rate of 
pollution (equation 45).  Taking  the partial derivatives of (44) and  (45) with 
respect to    and some amount of algebraic simplifications, we obtain  their 
respective derivative expressions as (a) and (b); 
1
12
(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
[1 (1 ) (1 ) ]
C g nx     
    


    

    




( / ) (1 (1 ) )( (1 ) )[ (1 ) ]
[1 (1 ) (1 ) ]
Z Z n x          
    


        

     
,           (b) 
 
where
1 [(1 )(1 ) ][1 (1 ) (1 ) ]       
          .The  numerator  in  the 
above derivative expression   in (a)  is  negative since  (1 )xn        by 
assumption while the denominator is guaranteed to be positive. It is not hard to 
see that the denominator of  the derivative expression (b) above  is positive 
since the term in bracket has the same sign as  . By our assumption that per 
capita  consumption  grows, the  numerator  in  (b)  may  very well be  negative. 
Hence, the sign on the derivative expressions in (a) and (b) are both negative. 
Thus, an  increase  in  the elasticity of  marginal  utility of consumption  makes 
the growth rates of both consumption and pollution  lower. That  is, pollution 
falls  more rapidly and consumption  grows slower as    becomes  larger.  The 
reason  here  is  not  farfetched:  an  increase  in    reduces  the  growth  rate  of 
consumption and hence output growth, which necessarily requires reduction in 
the  growth rate of  inputs  used  in production  if  the production process  is to 
remain technically efficient. 
   
To see the  impact of  the elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution on  the 
growth  rate  of  consumption  and  pollution  respectively,  we  take  the  partial 
derivative of equations (44) and (45) with respect to . After some amount of 




(1 ) (1 )[ (1 ) ]
[1 (1 ) (1 ) ]
C g nx      
    


     

    
                 (c) 
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( / ) (1 )(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) Z Z n x        

         


               (d) 
As before, the denominators of both equations (c) and (d) are known to be 
positive.  Clearly,  the  numerator  on  the  derivative  expression  in  (c)  is 
nonnegative while the sign on the numerator in (d) is not straight forward to 
see. Further investigations however show that the numerator is non-negative. 
Thus, both derivative expressions are positively  signed.  This  implies  that a 
higher value of   makes the growth rates of both consumption and pollution 
higher, other things equal. This means that agents require a greater increase in 
consumption to compensate them from the disutility of pollution. The fact that 
a higher  increases pollution growth rate is hard to discern since a stronger 
aversion  to  pollution  is  expected  to  make  the  pollution  growth  lower. 
However, looking at (23), if the initial pollution level is extremely low, for a 
given marginal utility, this makes pollution lower to some extent. 
 
3.3.2 Deviations from the benchmark case 
We now consider two possible deviations from the benchmark case discussed 
above.  Specifically,  we  consider  cases  in  which  the  growth  rates  of 
consumption and the capital stock differ (i.e. KC gg  ), starting with the case 
where consumption grows faster than the capital stock.   
   
Consumption grows faster than capital ( KC gg  ) 
Consider now a growth path where the growth rate of consumption is higher 
than the  growth  rate of the capital stock ( KC gg  ). Since  the exponential 
expression of the final term in (42) then grows faster, D will sooner or later 
turn negative and decline. In this case, history does not matter much: a country 
that has had debt in the past can repay all and invest abroad over time. This 
process  will be  faster  if  for  instance  the elasticity of  marginal disutility of 
pollution () is large (cf. (34)) which implies a strong aversion to pollution.  
 25 
 
In the first case where consumption grows faster than the capital stock, the 
economy  increasingly  makes  use  of  the  international  capital  market  to 
generate  income, and eventually the share of capital  in assets  is  negligible. 
However,  this  does  not  need  to  make  the  economy  a  large  player  in  the 
international capital  market,  which  would  violate the small  open economy 
assumption and make the exogenous-interest-rate assumption irrelevant.  To 
see this, suppose the rest of the world does not control emissions to the same 
extent as “our” country. Then a situation with  KC g g n x       is possible, 
which  would  make  / DD lower  than  the  international  growth  rate.  This 
country‟s claim on the rest of the world would not grow compared to the rest 
of the world, and thereby it remains a small player in the international capital 
market. 
 
It  is  interesting  to  investigate  now, the behaviour of the optimal pollution 
growth path  under this scenario.  With consumption growing  faster than the 
capital stock ( KC gg  ), the growth rate of the consumption-capital ratio must 
be positive (i.e.  0 g  ). By (37) a sufficient condition for a positive growth 
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,     1   .  
The  denominator  term  in  the  above  condition  is  positive.  The  sign  of  the 
numerator  in the second term on the right  hand side of the  inequality sign  is 
ambiguous.  Thus,  if  consumption  grows  faster,  than  the  capital  stock,  the 
socially  optimal  growth  rate  of  emissions  will  decrease  over  time  if 
(1 )xn       , so that the above condition will always be met. 
 
Consumption grows slower than Capital ( KC gg  ) 
We  turn  now  to  the  opposite  deviation  from  the  benchmark  case  where 
consumption grows slower than capital. This is highly possible in a country 
with low aversion to pollution. Then by (42), D will be growing in the long 
run, but not too fast to violate the TVC or the smallness criterion. Due to the 
low aversions to pollution, the country accepts to „produce for others‟ ( 0 D  ) 26 
 
and live with the extra pollution that this implies. The increase in the domestic 
capital stock makes the domestic income large but a greater share of it is used 
for servicing debt. 
 
In this case, the small economy becomes a net importer of capital and thus 
accumulates debt over  time. The economy  will  then act as  net exporter of 
goods, but its pollution as well as debt grows over time. However, given that 
the  transversality  condition  is  satisfied,  our  small  open  economy  does  not 
become overly indebted as time runs (which would mean that it could no more 
borrow from the international capital markets). Note also that the implication 
for the consumption-capital ratio along this growth path is that is growth rate 
will  be  negative.  What  does  this  imply  for  the  optimal  growth  path  of 
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This  will  be  consistent  with  our  earlier  conditions  on  the  interest  rate  if 
(1 ) nx       ,  since  r   .  What  is  the  implied  direction  of  optimal 
pollution path  under this  scenario? Whether pollution  grows (declines) over 
time  depends  on  whether  the  wedge  between  (1 )x    and  n   is  lager 
(less)  than  (1 )( ) r   .  Sufficient  for  this  condition  to  hold  is  that 
(1 )(1 )         which  is  never  satisfied  under  constant  returns  to  scale. 
While  we  cannot  tell  the  direction  of  the  growth  rate  of  emissions,  the 
possibility of positive growth cannot be ruled out. The reason is that high rate 
of  capital  accumulation  will  lead  to  increase  in  the  scale  of  domestic 
production which may lead to a greater use of pollution (because the marginal 
product of this factor is pulled upward).  
These findings reecho the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis and 
the pollution haven hypothesis. At the initial levels of development countries 
depend  much  on  domestic  production  to  finance  its  consumption  and 
investments. Over time  however,  it can afford to  invest  in the  international 
capital markets and thus cut down on the accumulation of domestic capital and 
hence production. This  is possible  if and only  if consumption grows  faster 27 
 
than the capital stock, though. Other things equal, this implies an inverted-U 
time path for emissions.  
 
4. Command optimum in the closed economy model 
We now  turn  to the closed economy  case.  The analysis  in this section,  in 
principle can be found elsewhere in the earlier literature. However, since we 
do not know any paper that has exactly the same formulation as the present 
one, the analysis in this section is necessary for comparison between the open 
and the closed cases. In the closed economy,  AK  and  0 DD  . Thus, in 
the  closed  economy,  the  debt  accumulation  constraint  disappears  from  the 
planner‟s optimization problem, hence we have  0   . By recalling that in the 
closed  economy  without  government  purchases,  I Y C ,  the  optimality 
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In the closed economy, the capital-output ratio v, is not a constant, and hence 
the growth rate of the shadow price of capital will also vary over time. This 
follows  from  the  fact  that  in  the  closed  economy  the  interest  rate  is  not 
constant. 
   
As  in the case of  the open  economy,  to develop some  implications of  the 
above conditions, we start by taking logs of both sides of equation (46) and 
differentiating with respect to time. Using the condition in equation (48), we 
obtain  the  consumption  Euler‟s  equation  for  the  planner‟s  optimization 
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Similar to the results obtained in the open economy case, the growth rate of 
aggregate  consumption  depends  on  the  parameters  in  the  utility  and  the 
production functions.  
 
Yet  another  useful  implication  concerns  pollution.  Taking  logs  of  the 
optimality condition with respect to pollution in (47) and differentiating the 
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                   (51)  
The above expression says that emissions grow in constant proportion with the 
sum of  the  growth rates of the shadow price of capital and  real  GDP.  An 
increase in the shadow price of capital makes the planner substitute capital for 
pollution whilst high GDP growth rate requires using more productive factors 
including emissions. 
 
4.1.  Dynamic systems 
In this section we develop a two dimensional dynamic system in consumption-
capital  ratio  and  capital-output  ratio  space.  To  begin  with,  we  substitute 
I Y C  into (17) and divide the results by K to obtain the growth rate of the 
capital stock as 
1 K
Kv
    .                   (52) 
Combining equations (50) and (52) and some algebraic simplifications give 
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                (53) 
To close the system, we derive the equation of motion for the capital-output 
ratio for the command optimal allocation as in equation (54). To derive (54) 
we combine equations (9), (48) and (52) together with equation (6). After a 
fair amount of algebra, we obtain the differential equation in (54).  29 
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              (54) 
Equations (53) and (54) constitute our dynamic system. In the appendix C to 
this paper, a condition that ensures that the dynamic system above is saddle 
path stable is derived. Here, we establish the existence of unique steady state 
by studying the iso-clines of the dynamic systems along which 0 v  . We 
do this by analyzing  the derivatives of  (53) and (54) along  the  0    and 
0 v    loci  in  a  v     plane.  When 0   ,  the  differential  equation  in  (53) 





    


     .  The  first  and  second 
derivative  with  respect  to  v  are   
2 ( )/ /v       and 
 
3 2 ( )/ /v     respectively.  Since  the  elasticity  of  marginal  utility  of 
consumption is higher than the elasticity of output with respect to capital, the 
first derivative is negative and the second, positive. Hence the  0    iso-cline 
is monotonically decreasing, but at an increasing rate in v.   
 
Turning to the differential equation in (54),  0 v   implies that  
(1 )(1 ) 1 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 )( )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 1
n n x
v
    
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                   
. This then means that the  0 v   locus is monotonically decreasing in v.  The 
absolute slope of the  0 v   iso-cline is greater than the slope of the 0    iso-
cline if(1 )(1 ) ( 1) 0          , which is always satisfied.   
 
By setting  0 v   in equations (53) and (54) and solving the resulting static 
two-equation systems we obtain the steady state values for the capital-output 
ratio and the consumption-capital ratio respectively as in equations (55) and 
(56) respectively.  
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Note that  from  equation (55),  the planner‟s steady  state choice of capital-
output ratio decreases in the elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution and 
hence rate of growth of pollution. This makes sense if we assume that capital 
intensive modes of production are dirty. The strength of the pollution growth 
effect on capital-output ratio depends on three parameters in our model, the 
elasticities of marginal utility of consumption, output with respect to capital 
and output with  respect to pollution. High  values of  elasticity of  marginal 
utility and elasticity of output with respect to pollution amplify the negative 
effect of pollution growth on the capital-output ratio. 
   
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.   (56) 
As seen from equation (56), the consumption-capital ratio under the command 
allocation increases in the subjective rate of time preference and the rate of 
depreciation.  However,  the effect of the  elasticity of  marginal  disutility of 
pollution  on  the  consumption-capital  ratio  is  ambiguous.  As  before,  the 
strength of  this  negative effect of pollution  growth on consumption-capital 
ratio depends on  the size of elasticities of  marginal  utility of consumption, 
output with respect to capital, labour and pollution. 
 
Now  that  the  steady  state  equilibrium  of  the  dynamic  system  given  by 
equations (53) and (54), has been identified, it is important to examine if the 
solution is stable when subjected to a slight perturbations to the steady state: 
does the system diverge from the equilibrium or return to it when perturbed?  
 
We focus on the question of whether the steady state is saddle point stable and 
thus  sensitive  to  slight  perturbations  of  the  capital-output  ratio  or  the 
consumption-capital ratio or not. We do this by examining the eigenvalues or 
characteristic roots of the Jacobian of the dynamic system given in (50) and 
(51). Since our focus is on saddle point stability, we require the determinant of 
the Jacobian to be negative. That is | | 0 J  . The condition that ensures this is  
1 [( 1) ] ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( ) Y C K g g g n
     
   

      
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(See  appendix  C  for  detailed  mathematical  derivations  on  local  stability 
analysis).  The  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  above  inequality 
expression  may  very  well be positive; the second term cannot be  signed  a 
priori. However, stability requires that the growth rate of the economy should 
be higher than a certain threshold which is expected to be positive.  
 
4.2 Steady state growth rates 
We have already mentioned that pollution is a choice variable in the planner‟s 
maximization  problem.  The  interesting  question  then  is  how  does  the 
planner‟s choice of pollution path affects long run growth? By equation (9) 
and the steady state condition that  // Y Y K K  , we obtain the growth rate of 
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                 (57) 
From  the  expression  above,  a  policy  that  aims  to  decrease  the  level  of 
pollution over time ( /0 ZZ  ), will have negative effect on long run growth. 
Ambitious environmental care can however allow for growth  in our setting 
provided that Z does not decline too fast.  
 
At the steady state aggregate production, consumption and the capital stock all 
grow  at  the  same  constant  rate  of 
** / / / 1/ Y Y C C K K v       . 
Substituting the steady state values for 
* v and 
*  into the above expression and 
simplifying, we obtain the following solution for the socially optimal growth 
rate of aggregate variables at the steady state. 
( ) (1 )
( 1) (1 )(1 )
C Y K
xn
g g g n x
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    
   
               (58) 
Now the similarity between the growth rate in the closed and open economy 
cases are obvious; in both cases, the growth rate is lower than in the standard 
model without pollution.  An important difference however is that the growth 
rate is influence by the size of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. 
As was found in the open economy case, the elasticity of output with respect 
to  pollution  and  the  elasticity  of  marginal  disutility  of  pollution  play 32 
 
significant role on the size of the drag that environmental policy imposes on 
growth.  
 
It is now interesting to investigate whether the drag imposed on growth by 
environmental care is larger or smaller in the open economy relative to the 
closed economy case. It can be shown that the size of the drag depends on the 
relationship between the growth rates of consumption and the capital stock in 
the open economy case. If consumption grows faster than the capital stock, the 
drag is always larger in the open economy case. Comparing (58) with (33), we 
show that the drag is larger in the open economy case if; 
11
(1 )









     
. 
This is the same condition that we derived in the open economy case where 
consumption is assumed to be growing faster than the capital stock. Thus the 
possibility of satisfying  part of the domestic consumption through  imports 
amplifies the negative effect of demand for environmental quality on growth.  
The opposite holds when the capital stock grows faster than consumption. This 
becomes obvious when one reverses the inequality in the previous condition. 
 
We  finally turn to the steady state optimal pollution  growth  in  the closed 
economy. We obtain this by substituting equations (57) and (58)  into (51). 
This with some algebra yields the results in (56). 
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( 1)
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                 (59) 
Recalling that  1   ,  the  growth  rate  of  pollution  is  negative  if  and  only  if 
(1 ) nx       . This is in sharp contrast to the condition obtained in the 
open economy case. This becomes obvious if one compares equation (59) with 
(35). Recall that in the open economy, pollution growth at the steady state is 
negative if and only if  
  (1 ) (1 ) r x n            . 
This  inequality  is  somehow  reversed  in  the  closed  economy  case  where 
negative  growth  rate  of  pollution  requires  that  (1 ) 0 xn        .  Thus 
given the elasticity of output with respect to effective labour and pollution, the 33 
 
direction of the  growth rate of optimal emissions  is driven by  the relative 
strength of the rates of population  growth and technological progress. Note 
however, that in the open economy the wedge between the world interest rate 
and the rate of time preference play a role in this. In the closed economy, the 
growth  rate  in  pollution  increases  in  the  rate  of  population  growth  but 
decreases in the rate of technological progress. Remember that this is slightly 
the opposite of the open economy case. The reason why pollution increases 
with the rate of population growth is not hard to discern: more labour makes 
the  marginal  product  of  pollution  higher  and  therefore  reduce  the  optimal 
reduction  in  pollution.  Also  higher  population  implies  higher  consumption 
which can only be satisfied with increased production  in a closed economy 
which  may  require  more  pollution  for  a  given  technology.  Similarly, 
technological progress allows  the economy to  have  faster  improvements  in 
instantaneous utility: it can afford to increase the utility of consumption and 
decrease  the  disutility  of  pollution  at  higher  rates.  In  other  words, 
technological  progress  improves  the  trade-off  between  consumption  and 
pollution in favour of consumption. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper examined the effect on growth of the demand for environmental 
quality  in  a  small  open  economy.  Our  analysis  reveals  the  following 
conclusions.  Environmental  care  imposes  a  drag  on  long  run  economic 
growth,  by  increasing  the  capital-output  ratio  and  lowering  the  returns  to 
capital. This result becomes less severe when the economy is closed and trade 
in goods and assets across national borders are not allowed.   
 
Our analysis of the open economy case also reveals that whilst the  growth 
rates of consumption, output, the capital stock and pollution are constant, there 
are  three  possible  qualitative  scenarios  with  respect  to  the  debt.  First,  we 
considered a benchmark scenario in which consumption and capital grow at a 
common rate. Under this scenario, we show that the debt and capital stock 
grow at a common rate and hence the debt-capital ratio is constant at all points 
in time. The implication of this is that the history of the debt and the capital 
stock  puts  a  constraint  on  the  initial  consumption  level.  We  show  that  a 34 
 
country  which  has  had  a  history  of  generous  lending  will  benefit  from  it 
twofold. It can afford  to choose a  high consumption path  and also  have a 
considerable share of its income from the international capital market, which 
does not cause any negative pollution effect on this country. In the second case 
where consumption grows faster than the capital stock, we show that the small 
open economy eventually exports  capital  (negative debt)  to the rest of  the 
world by accumulating assets abroad over time. This process is faster if the 
elasticity of marginal disutility of pollution is high relative to the rest of the 
world so that it has higher drag on (production) growth. As a final scenario, 
we considered the opposite scenario where the capital stock grows faster than 
consumption. In this case we show that the economy imports capital due to the 
low aversion  to pollution,  and  thus accumulate debt.   A  high demand  for 
environmental  quality  is  found  to  induce  capital  flight  from  high  income 
countries to poor countries with lower demand for environmental quality. This 
result  offers  an  alternative  restatement  of  the  pollution  haven  hypothesis. 
Furthermore,  our  analysis  shows  that  the  drag  that  the  demand  for 
environmental quality imposes on growth is larger in the open economy if and 
only if consumption grows faster than the capital stock. In the reverse case 
where the capital stock grows faster than consumption, the drag is smaller in 














Appendix A:  Decentralized solution 
Then the objective of the household is to maximize 
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with respect to C,  subject to  
A wL rA C      ,                  (A2) 
The current value Hamiltonian for the above dynamic optimization problem is: 
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Note  that  the  household  cannot  influence  Z.  It  is  therefore  not  a  choice 
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Taking logs of equation (A4), differentiating both sides with respect to time 
and using condition (A7), we obtain the familiar consumption Euler equation.  
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From equation (62),  / (1/ ) K K v     . Using this and (A8) in (A9): 
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This  is  the  first  of  two  differential  equations  in    and  v,  describing  the 
dynamics of the model. 
Derivation of the equation of motion for the COR in a decentralized Ramsey 
Closed economy model 
v K Y
v K Y
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Substituting equations (17) and (A15) into (A11), we obtain the equation of 
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Appendix B: Computation of the steady state values of   and v in the 
decentralized Ramsey economy 
At the steady state; 
0 v   .                    (B1) 
Invoking the steady state condition on equation (A10) and (A16), we obtain 
equations (B2) and (B3). 
 
11
0 (1 ) n
v

     










   
  
       

            (B3) 
Combine equations (B2) and (B3) to eliminate   . We  do  this  by  equating 
(B2) and (B3). 
   
1 1 1
(1 ) n x n
vv
  
     
  

                       (B4) 
   
11
1 (1 ) n x n
v
  
     
  
            
  
   
   
11
(1 ) n x n
v

     
  
         
   
11
(1 ) n x n
v

     
  
          
              (B5)
   
Equation (B5) implies; 







     
  
 
              
  .            (B6)
   
Substituting (B5) into (B3) gives the steady state value of the consumption to 
capital ratio as 
   
1
(1 ) n x n
  
      
  
           






Appendix C: Local stability analysis 
Consider the following first order non-linear homogeneous dynamic system. 
( , ) fv                       (C1) 
( , ) v g v                       (C2) 
Making Taylor approximation around the steady state and indicating steady 
state values with a star, we have the following: 
* * * * * * ( , )( ) ( , )( ) v f v f v v v                         (C3) 
* * * * * * ( , )( ) ( , )( ) v v g v g v v v                        (C4) 
These expressions can be rewritten as: 
 
* * * * * * * * * * ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) vv f v f v v f v f v v                         (C3‟) 
 
* * * * * * * * * * ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) vv v g v g v v g v g v v                      (C-4‟) 
Note that the right hand sides of the last two equations are constants. Dropping 
these constants,  we  have  the  following reduced dynamic  system  in  matrix 
form. 
* * * *
* * * *
( , ) ( , ) 0




f v f v





      
               
              (C5) 
* * * *
* * * *
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
v v
v v
ff f v f v
J






     
              (C6) 









   





( ) 0 v v v
trJ J
J rI
r f f r f g g f   

       
2 ( ) det 0 r trJ r J     






 ,     1,2 i                  (C8) 
 
In our case we have the following first order nonlinear dynamic systems of 
differential equations. 39 
 






                                                                    (C9)





v n x v
    
     
   
                 
           (C10) 
 
Rewrite the last two expressions in terms of    and  v as; 
  2 ( , ) fv
v

   


                   (C9‟) 
 
1 1 1
( , ) 1 ( )
1 1 1
v g v v n x v
    
     
   
                  
        (C10‟) 
where   
1 (1 ) n      
     . 
Before  computing  the  derivatives,  it  is  useful  to  obtain  the  „steady  state‟ 
conditions which follow from putting 0 v  : 






                   (C11) 
 
1 1 1
0 1 ( )
1 1 1
v n x v
    
    
   
                 
           (C12) 














                 (C13) 
Equation (C12) implies; 
 
1
1 1 ( )
1
v n x v

    
  
         
   









    

              (C14) 
 





































( , ) 0
vv
fv 
   











* 2 * 2 ( , )
( ) ( )
v fv
vv















* * * 1
( , )
1









* * * 1
( , ) 1 ( )
1
v g v n x

     












    




































        
              (C15) 
 














To determine  the sign of this,  it  is  instructive to substitute the steady state 
values for the CCR and COR (See appendix B1) 
    (1 ) n x n
   
      
  




    *
11
(1 ) n x n
v

     
  
               
 
   





trJ n x n
n x n
   
     
  
   
     
   
          

                    
 
   




(1 ) (1 )
1
trJ n x n x
nn
      
   
    
   
       
   
                             
               
 




trJ n x n
         
     
       
                              
 
      
11
1 ( 1)(1 ) (1 )
1 (1 )
trJ n x n

          
   
                
   
Given that the final expressions in each term are positive,  1    is sufficient 
condition for positive trace of the Jacobian in (C15). 
 









    
  

   










     

   









     

   
   
 








     

    











   


    
   
 
 
There is an interesting relationship among the characteristic roots, the trace of 
the Jacobian and  the determinant of Jacobian. We explore that relationship 
here. It holds that   12 r r trJ   and  12 || rr J  . For saddle point stability, the 42 
 
determinant  must  be  negative  which  means  that  one  of  the  two  roots  is 
negative and the other positive. 
 
Condition for saddle point stability 
We  have saddle point path  if the determinant of  the  Jacobian  is  negative, 
implying that the two roots of the characteristic equation of the Jacobian have 
reverse signs.  










   


    





1 ( ) 1





   


    
     
 
** ( ) 1 0 v      





   
     
   
1
(1 ) (1 )
1
(1 )
n x n n
n x n
   
         
   

     
  
             

               
 
   







   
     
   

     
  
                
   
         

 
   
11
(1 ) n x n
    
     
     
                    
    
 
   
(1 )
(1 ) n x n
   
     
 
                
   
 
   
(1 )
(1 ) n x n
  
     

         

 
   
(1 )
(1 ) n x n
  
     

         

 
Using  the  optimal  tax  rule  (see  appendix  D1  below),  we  can  restate  the 
stability condition in terms of the planner‟s solution as follows 43 
 
 
1 ( ) (1 ) [( 1) ] ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( )
( 1) (1 )(1 )
xn
n x n
        
    
     
         
     
   
 
Note that the left hand side of the above expression is the common growth rate 
that  we  obtained  in  (58).  Hence  the  stability  condition  for  the  differential 
equation system in (53) and (54) is stated here as  
1 [( 1) ] ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( ) Y C K g g g n
     
   

      

























Appendix D: Optimal tax rule 
From  the optimality condition  in (4),  we obtain the  following  relationship 
among the growth rates of pollution tax, aggregate production and aggregate 






Imposing the planners steady state growth rate of aggregate production and 
pollution into the above condition for the growth rate of the pollution tax, we 
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       
       
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
       
 
( 1)(1 ) ( 1)
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Z x n
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    
   
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        
        
    
   
       
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( 1) (1 )(1 ) ( 1) (1 )(1 )
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        
     
       
      
           
      
           
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
   
 
 
Appendix D2: Steady state values for v and  under optimal policy 
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   
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   
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Appendix D3: Steady state growth rates of aggregate and per capita variables 
in decentralized Ramsey economy 
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The optimal tax rule satisfies, 
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Substituting  this  into  the  expression  for  the  growth  rate  of  aggregate 
production, we obtain the steady state growth rate as follows: 
   
( ) (1 )
( 1) (1 )(1 ) ( 1) (1 )(1 )
Y
n x x n
Y
    
       

   
       
 
   
( ) (1 )
11




    
       
    






( 1) (1 )(1 ) ( ) ( 1) (1 )(1 ) (1 )




            
       
           






( 1) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )




       
       
       





(1 )(1 ) ( 1) (1 )(1 )
( 1) (1 )(1 )
xn Y
Y
       
   
        

   
 
Note  that  we  have  the  same  results  as  the  one  obtained  under  command 
allocation. 
According to equation (59) in the main text, per capita variables grow at the 








in a decentralized equilibrium. This implies that; 47 
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Again,  we  have  the  same  expression  for  the  growth  rate  for  per  capita 
variables as in the command optimal allocation. Thus, we can conclude that 
with  the  Pigouvian  tax  optimally  set,  the  command  allocation  and 
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